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The boy, whose story I am about to tell, was named Jack Perverse, and his nature was answerable to his 
name. —George Burder, Early Piety
Introduction: Jack, James, and the Perverse Child
Jack Perverse was a naughty boy. He did  
everything a good boy shouldn’t do: he caused 
mischief at school, rushed through his prayers, lied 
to his parents, and tortured hapless insects. Jack 
Perverse was punished for his sins: he drowned in a 
river alongside his equally perverse friend. Fortunately, 
Jack Perverse was a fictional naughty boy, so had 
he survived, he never would have grown up into a 
naughty, perverse real adult.
James Hearne was also a naughty boy; at least, Mr. 
Bradbury said he was. James Hearne sodomized his 
fellow apprentice, cavorted in alehouses with older 
men, and told many lies—at least, so Mr. Bradbury 
claimed. Then James Hearne accused Mr. Bradbury 
of sodomy, and Mr. Bradbury went to court, where 
he said that James was a naughty, perverse boy who 
should be punished, just like Jack. But unlike Jack 
Perverse, James Hearne was a real-life naughty boy, 
and James had a story that was a bit more complicated 
than Jack’s.
Jack Perverse and James Hearne are two 
eighteenth-century children—one fictional, one 
historical—in whom we see a collision between the 
complex discourses of childhood and perversity. 
Jack, a character from George Burder’s Romantic-
era evangelical children’s book Early Piety (1777), 
functioned as a cautionary tale for children: obey your 
parents, behave at school, say your prayers, and respect 
nature, or the consequences could be fatal. Jack is 
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a version of the child who is beyond salvation; his 
untimely fate is foretold by his name. The Romantics, 
as Frances Ferguson explains, endeavoured to 
“segment[] the time of their lives into a series of stages 
and treat[] those stages as if they could be coherently 
described and predicted,” and texts like Burder’s 
worked to shape childhood as a legible category of 
identity (216). Although Jack’s evil is inherent and his 
fate sealed, he works pedagogically to offer children 
an alternative to his demise: be good, resist temptation, 
and preserve your innocence, and you will either grow 
into a productive adult or, should you die young, you 
will go to heaven.1
Hearne’s case is a complex and fascinating 
precursor to these two overlapping conceptualizations 
of the child seen in Early Piety and other Romantic 
texts: he is both the dangerous, inherently perverse 
child who should be prevented from entering 
adulthood and the innocent child who is susceptible 
to perversion, a child who must be protected 
and educated such that he becomes a “normal” 
(heterosexual, labouring, investment-oriented) adult.2 
The transcript of Charles Bradbury’s 1755 sodomy 
trial and subsequent related publications reflect ideas 
about childhood and perversity that have roots in John 
Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education, that 
were elaborated in Romantic-era literature for and 
about children, and that persist today in discourse 
surrounding the regulation of child and youth sexuality. 
I have selected this historical case to illustrate how 
Romantic ideas of childhood and perversity were 
forming prior to the beginning of the Romantic 
era and to demonstrate how these ideas transform 
conceptions of “real” children (like Hearne).3 As I will 
argue, Hearne’s actual behaviour likely exceeded his 
representation in the documents related to the trial, but 
Hearne is nonetheless narrated and read through two 
reductive tropes: Jack Perverse and his opposite, the 
innocent child prone to perversion. These paradoxical 
narratives of childhood perversity have been repeated 
for centuries, and their continuing purchase in 
contemporary discourse becomes obvious when they 
are read beside recent theoretical work on childhood 
and sexuality. Steven Bruhm and Natasha Hurley’s 
Curiouser: On the Queerness of Children and Kathryn 
Bond Stockton’s The Queer Child, for example, make 
productive interventions into what Bruhm and Hurley 
call the “dominant narrative about children: children 
are (and should stay) innocent of sexual desires and 
intentions” (“Curiouser” ix). In 2006, Stephen Harper’s 
Conservative government drew on such familiar stories 
to justify an increase in Canada’s age of sexual consent 
from fourteen to sixteen years, for the ostensible 
purpose of “prevent[ing] adults from preying on 
young teens” (“Age”). Today, hegemonic discourses 
of sexuality remain invested in the notion that every 
child either contains a nascent Jack Perverse or is 
vulnerable to corruption by one. I want to challenge 
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the comfortable familiarity of this narrative, invite 
inquiry into the slippages and excesses that emerge 
from oversimplified accounts of child sexuality and 
perversity, and argue that the way in which children 
fashion their own day-to-day lives always resists facile 
categorization and the coherent description and 
prediction that narratives like Burder’s attempt to enact. 
In other words, the material James Hearne is always in 
excess of the fictional Jack Perverse.
I begin this essay with an overview of the  
discourse of childhood and perversity in pre-Romantic 
and Romantic thought, and with a consideration of 
how anxieties about perversion manifest themselves  
in discourses of juvenile delinquency. I then take up 
two paradoxical narratives of the child and look for 
their traces in the transcript of Charles Bradbury’s 
sodomy trial and three pamphlets that were published 
following his acquittal. I argue that, from the interstices 
of the narratives that alternately construct Hearne as 
innately and hopelessly perverse and as a child in 
need of salvation, there emerges a proliferation of 
other, more complicated stories, including a reading of 
Hearne as a self-fashioned pervert who deploys  
his sexuality for the purpose of survival, moving in and 
out of what sociologist Anthony Giddens calls “pure 
relationships” (qtd. in Sha 49). In lieu of the reductive 
versions of Hearne produced through Bradbury’s trial, 
I would like to ask whether Hearne can be seen as a 
more complicated figure than a child whose identity is 
constituted entirely by the adults who endeavour  
to interpret and narrate it. Did Hearne perhaps take  
up a perverse sexuality with agency in the midst of 
adults who were trying to make him work discursively 
for them in particular ways? Read in light of Michel  
de Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life, Hearne  
can be seen as a figure who employed a series of 
tactics (sexual and otherwise) to “make do” in a  
space where his movements were limited and  
defined by his age and by his working-class status.4 
To illustrate the concept of “making do,” de Certeau 
provides the example of a North African immigrant 
living in France who brings his own language and 
living habits to bear on the foreign space in which  
he lives. “Without leaving the place where he has  
no choice to live and which lays down its law for  
him,” de Certeau writes, “he establishes within it a 
degree of plurality and creativity. By an art of being 
in between, he draws unexpected results from his 
situation” (30). As I will demonstrate, Hearne  
appeared to navigate his relationships with Bradbury 
and the other adults who both supported and  
scorned him with a similar type of tactical creativity. 
The idea of Hearne as a sexual agent was  
unimaginable and unspeakable in the discourse 
surrounding Bradbury’s trial, and such notions of 
consent and agency remain silent sources of deep-
seated anxiety in contemporary debates about  
child sexuality.5
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Perversity, Puberty, Delinquency, and Romantic Childhood
In her preface to The Parent’s Assistant, a Romantic-era collection 
of didactic fiction, Maria Edgeworth tellingly writes: “If we could 
obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath passed in the mind 
of a child, from the beginning of life and sensation, . . . this would 
be a treasure of natural history, which would probably give more 
light into the human faculties, than all the systems of philosophers 
about them, since the beginning of the world” (5). Indeed, the 
project of coming to know the ideal child proved challenging for 
the Romantics; since the idea of childhood exists only through what 
Stockton calls a “backward birthing mechanism” on the part of 
adults, who create and define the category retrospectively, a child’s 
“true” knowledge and motives ultimately remain inaccessible (7). 
Texts like Early Piety and The Parent’s Assistant undertook the project 
of fashioning childhood, attempting to know the child by shaping 
the child’s knowledge, but childhood itself always seemed to resist 
coherence. Even establishing a straightforward legal definition 
of childhood proved exigent. In her introduction to Fashioning 
Childhood in the Eighteenth Century, Anja Müller observes that 
dealing with eighteenth-century culture requires “broadness because 
the terms ‘child’ or ‘childhood’ were applied to life stages of varying 
length, and the duration of childhood depended on the discourse 
in which the term was used. Childhood as an age of both sexual 
and moral innocence, for instance, was commonly believed to 
end at six or seven. Marriage—and thus independence from the 
parental household—was legally possible for girls of fourteen and 
boys of sixteen” (4–5). To complicate the issue further, the age at 
which children were considered to have the rational capacity of an 
adult was both socially and legally ambiguous. As Anna-Christina 
Texts like Early Piety 
and The Parent’s Assistant 
undertook the project 
of fashioning childhood, 
attempting to know the 
child by shaping the child’s 
knowledge, but childhood 
itself always seemed to 
resist coherence.
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Giovanopoulos illustrates, civil law placed “the age 
of discretion” for boys at fourteen years; a boy’s 
father, however, “could appoint a guardian by statute 
to protect the child, ‘considering the imbecility of 
judgment in children of the age of fourteen’” (48). 
Legally speaking, then, a fourteen-year-old was seen as 
capable of substantial reason but still at risk of childlike 
foolishness. As a result of these ambiguities, Ferguson 
claims, children “become the occasion for debating 
the meaning of the old notion of an age of reason 
or consent, because the very distinction between 
childish unreason and adult reason comes to look like 
the paradigmatic instance of apportioning the world 
and segregating some persons from others” (217). The 
impossibility of defining childhood concretely was a 
source of anxiety for the Romantics since, in practice, 
children were not transparent to adult understanding. 
Much of this anxiety revolved around the inherent and/
or potential perversity of children.
At its roots, perversity has a definition that exceeds 
its contemporary association with sexuality. Stockton 
suggests that “perverts are ‘diverts’ . . . who extend 
themselves or linger. That is to say, perversions are 
characteristic of people who either extend themselves 
beyond the normal ‘path’ or linger at midpoints along 
the way” (25; emphasis in orig.). In his Perverse 
Romanticism, Richard C. Sha draws a similar, yet more 
concise, definition from the Oxford English Dictionary, 
which describes perversion as a “turning aside from 
what is true or right” (5). Jack Perverse is not a sexual 
pervert, then, but true to his name in his diversion 
from the “right,” holy path that a good child would 
follow. Provocatively, Sha suggests that perversion “is 
entangled with the history of subversion—‘turning 
upside down’ (OED)—[which] further makes it rife 
for critical discovery” (5). In Sha’s view, perversion’s 
(dangerous) potential lies not only in its “turning aside” 
from truth, but also in the possibility that the truth itself 
may be upended.
For the Romantics, childhood was paradoxically 
an inherently perverse state (an indeterminate 
“lingering” en route to adulthood) and a confounding 
“incoherence” from which a nascent perversity could 
emerge (Sha 80). The uncertainty of puberty seemed 
to necessitate management: “the problem,” according 
to Sha, “was that, because sex was a process and 
because everyone went through puberty, everyone was 
vulnerable to missteps on the way to heterosexuality” 
(82). Children thus had to be prevented from making 
these missteps (or having others cause them to 
misstep), and puberty served only to complicate the 
barrier between child and adult instead of delineating it 
more clearly. Citing the 1771 Encyclopedia Britannica, 
Sha reports that puberty was understood as beginning 
when a child was able to procreate (twelve years 
for boys, fourteen years for girls) and lasting for at 
least seven years (107). Seen as a lengthy “moment 
of biological potentiality in all bodies” without an 
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established conclusion, a life stage that functioned 
at best as a precarious threshold between child and 
adulthood, puberty enabled “the youthful body to be 
read as full of perverse potentiality” (Sha 241–42). 
As perverse (and even dangerously subversive) 
potential was attributed to children—compounded 
by a puberty of indeterminate length—two particular 
narratives of childhood surfaced in texts designed to 
manage children’s behaviour and guide their growth in 
particular ways. These narratives—about the inherently 
perverse child, the child beyond salvation, and the 
innocent child who is endangered by his or her own 
nascent perversity and/or corruption at the hands of 
perverse adults6—aimed to enable straightforward 
understandings of childhood and to prevent a child’s 
diversion from the “true” or “right” path to adulthood.
The first child, embodied by Burder’s Jack Perverse, 
engages in practices (such as the torture of animal 
life) that are seen to foreshadow a perverse, criminal 
adulthood.7 Jack Perverse, writes Burder, “was not only 
idle, but cruel. He used to catch flies on purpose to 
torment them; and was guilty of that horrid practice 
of making cockchafers spin, by putting a crooked 
pin through their tails, and hanging them by a bit of 
thread, which puts them in terrible agonies” (41–42). 
To make explicit the correlation between perversity in 
childhood and criminal adulthood, Burder inserts into 
the tale of Jack Perverse an interjection from a youth 
named Master Tender, which allows Burder’s reader to 
understand how Jack Perverse would have turned out 
had he not been punished by death:
And Master Tender could not help saying, “I am 
astonished at the hardness of that heart, which 
can take delight in beholding the agonies of poor 
dumb creatures; as it brings to mind what I once 
read of the wise Athenians, who condemned a boy 
for putting out the eyes of birds with a hot needle, 
judging that such seeds of cruelty would necessarily 
grow up into more dreadful acts of violence, and 
endanger the lives of men, and the happiness of 
mankind: the boy was therefore put to death.” (42)
In this brief story, the “seeds of evil” that exist in the 
unnamed youth (and perhaps in every child) render 
him unworthy of a complete transition into adulthood: 
he is deemed too volatile, too dangerous, and is thus 
exterminated. Like Burder, Vicesimus Knox theorizes 
versions of a child with inherent criminal impulses.  
In Elegant Extracts (1824), a collection of English 
literary standards with didactic aims, Knox counsels 
children: “When criminal thoughts arise, attend to all 
the proper methods of speedily suppressing  
them. . . . By such means you may stop the progress 
of the growing evil; you may apply an antidote, before 
the poison has had time to work its full effect” (72). 
Notably, Knox chooses to use “when” and not the 
speculative “if” at the beginning of his phrase: perverse 
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 3.1 (2011) 17Derritt Mason
thoughts are understood as intrinsic to every child. This 
understanding of children justified the application of 
the death penalty to young juvenile delinquents,  
a law that was revised in 1796 to prevent children 
under the age of seven from being hanged. Between 
the ages of seven and fourteen years, Uwe Böker 
explains, delinquents were sentenced based on the 
apparent strength of their understanding and judgment, 
so the death sentence remained possible for children 
who seemed to possess adult-like cognitive abilities 
(135). While laws shifted to recognize that younger 
children might not be able to engage in moral self-
evaluation prior to acting, legislators also left room  
for interpretation: children could be seen as so 
knowingly perverse that their total elimination could 
be legally justified. In addition to being endangered  
by their own burgeoning perversity, Romantic  
children were understood as the innocent potential 
prey of perverse adults who were eager to seduce 
children into the criminal underworld. This anxiety 
manifested itself quite visibly in reports on the state of 
juvenile delinquency.
In 1833, Thomas Wontner published Old Bailey 
Experience, a critique of late-eighteenth- and early-
nineteenth-century strategies for criminal reformation. 
He writes at length about juvenile offenders, arguing 
that corporeal punishment and lengthy prison 
sentences were ineffective in deterring crime; instead, 
children should be protected from harmful influences 
like penny theatres and chapbooks, or what he calls 
“the low publications” (298). Wontner considers 
juvenile delinquency to be, in Böker’s words, “a 
class-specific phenomenon, with the male child or 
youth as the target of education, rather than punitive 
treatment, by middle-class reformers” (136). In spite 
of Wontner’s critical approach, he nonetheless posits 
a view of childhood that conforms to the model 
of the endangered innocent child. As Gary Kelly 
notes, Wontner “tried to understand the mentality 
of offenders, but in the end could only see it as a 
defective or perverse form of his own middle-class 
consciousness rather than a social psychology of 
calculated defiance of and resistance to economic and 
social structures that marginalized and exploited the 
lower classes” (349). For example, Wontner explains 
that “the seducers of youth find an able auxiliary in 
the minor theatres, where they are generally sought. 
The men know, if a boy has a passion for these low 
exhibitions, that he is a sure prize . . . in very many 
instances the offences for which [these boys] stood 
committed were occasioned by their want of money to 
gratify this passion” (297). In this case, the dangerous 
combination of a seductive adult and a child unable 
to suppress his innate passions produces the perverse 
criminal child. As Kelly points out, the idea of a child 
with agency is impossible in Wontner’s narrative. 
Notably, Wontner uses highly sexualized language 
to describe how children react to penny-theatre 
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performances, alluding to the sexual perversions supposedly 
entailed by juvenile delinquency:
The mind . . . is taken by storm, and surprised, when they 
feel as if they had sustained an internal mental explosion—a 
mine of desires are sprung, of which they heretofore had no 
comprehension. . . . They then become bent on exploits of 
some kind, and on the unbridled indulgences of those passions, 
which at this critical period of their lives are awakened: in this 
feverish state, there is no one near them competent to reason 
down their intemperate sensations, and they fall an easy victim 
into the service of any one who is willing to receive them for 
initiation into crime. (310)
Succumbing to their natural, passionate urges, blinded by the 
jouissance triggered by an evening at the low theatre, and lacking 
the critical rationality of adulthood, children are perverted by 
the adults who would seduce them. “Libidinous desires are early 
excited,” continues Wontner, “and crime becomes (if not before 
known) contemporaneous with them” (313).
Toward the end of his essay, Paul Kelleher poses a question 
raised by the paradoxical relationship between childhood and 
perversity: “do ‘we’ imagine that the child needs protection from 
the idea or the representation of perversion, from individuals  
who qualify as perverts, or from the perversion that is congenital 
to the child?” (159). I would also ask further: how do children 
negotiate the theoretical dangers into which they are placed?  
How, following de Certeau, do children “make do” under  
trying circumstances? Wontner seems to start down this path in  
. . . children could be 
seen as so knowingly 
perverse that their total 
elimination could be 
legally justified.
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his discussion of child pickpockets:
This life would be unendurable were it not for 
companionship, and the only saving clause in 
their favour, that at night, when quite exhausted, 
and nearly starved, they are sure to meet with a 
commiserating friend, whose predations have been 
more successful than their own, and who never 
fails to share his crust with those to whom fortune 
has been less kind. . . . They are deemed hardened 
because they resort to crime over and over again: 
the truth is, they have no other alternative. (356)
In this strikingly sympathetic passage, Wontner alludes 
not only to the sense of culture and camaraderie 
among pickpockets, but also to children’s resilience 
and ability to formulate tactics for survival. Although 
this gesture to the agency of juvenile delinquents 
points to the limits of the innocent-child-in-danger 
motif that otherwise pervades Wontner’s work, it 
remains undeveloped. Wontner’s brief description 
of community and generosity among juvenile 
delinquents, however, remains a noteworthy  
moment of slippage in an otherwise familiar and 
repetitive story about perverse and corrupted children. 
It is with this narrative interruption in mind that I 
move to my discussion of James Hearne and Charles 
Bradbury’s trial.
James Hearne’s Case Restated
On 10 September 1755, at London’s Old Bailey 
courthouse, Charles Bradbury was acquitted of the 
sodomy charges laid against him by James Hearne, 
a fourteen-year-old apprentice. It is difficult to 
determine whether the trial was of much public 
interest at the time: a search of relevant eighteenth-
century newspapers and periodicals yields no results. 
The case seems to have garnered enough attention, 
however, for Bradbury to surmise that his reputation 
had been substantially damaged. Following the trial, 
he published Mr. Bradbury’s Case Truly Stated, his 
detailed version of the events, written “to wipe off 
every Stain injuriously thrown on my Character, 
and efface every Impression which this malicious 
prosecution may have made on the Minds of my 
Friends, to my Disadvantage” (5). In response to 
Bradbury’s pamphlet, a cobbler named John Taylor, 
who apparently was not implicated in the trial in any 
capacity other than as an interested observer (and 
as a would-be investigative reporter), interviewed 
witnesses from the trial and subsequently published 
Remaks [sic] on Mr. Bradbury’s State of His Case, an 
attempt to expose Bradbury as a liar and a sodomite 
and give his name a second vigorous drag through 
the mud. Enraged, Bradbury published a second 
pamphlet, The Cobler Undone, by the Loss of his Awl 
and his Ends, a venomous reply to Taylor in which 
he defends himself against the cobbler’s “bundle 
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 3.1 (2011)20 Derritt Mason
of defamation” by picking apart Taylor’s arguments 
with a fine-tooth comb (3). Reading the Old Bailey 
transcript from Bradbury’s trial and then working 
chronologically through the subsequent publications, 
I find that three trends in the overall narrative become 
clear. First, the dialogue between Bradbury and Taylor 
eventually degenerates into attempts to prove or 
to disprove minutiae that seem almost irrelevant to 
the case itself and into comical slanderous personal 
attacks against one another. For example, Bradbury 
in The Cobler Undone writes, “John, be advised by 
a friend, never sit down to write when you come 
from an alehouse, but go to bed directly, or else take 
a nod in your stall, till the muddy particles of the fat 
ale are a little evaporated” (12). Second, the details 
of the case become increasingly convoluted and 
bizarre, resulting in an overwhelming accumulation of 
secondary characters, witness statements, published 
letters, and disputed events.8 Finally, and most 
importantly for this essay, Hearne is absented from the 
duelling narratives until he practically ceases to exist. 
The dialogue between Bradbury and Taylor becomes 
so focused on proving or disproving Bradbury’s 
perversion that Hearne is required only as a secondary 
character—as an innocent child taken up by Taylor as 
a weapon or as a perverse one used by Bradbury in 
his own defence. Hearne is either the passive victim of 
Bradbury’s exploitation or an inherently perverse child 
whose evil nature is a danger to Bradbury’s reputation 
and potentially his life. In other words, Hearne is 
unimagined (or unimaginable) as an active player in 
the battle between Bradbury and Taylor; Hearne as a 
child acting with agency is unspoken or unspeakable. 
Instead, reductive narratives of Hearne’s identity as an 
innocent or perverse child become the battleground 
upon which Bradbury and Taylor’s duel takes place.
There are two versions of the story given in the 
Old Bailey transcript before Hearne recants and 
Bradbury is acquitted.9 Hearne, first to take the stand, 
explains that he was raised Catholic in France and 
met Bradbury (a Protestant minister) when Hearne’s 
fellow apprentice invited him to hear Bradbury preach 
at Glover’s Hall. Hearne attended several sermons 
and claims that Bradbury accosted him one day after 
asking to speak with him alone: “he took me upon 
his knee, and dragg’d me by the coat, and kissed me; 
then he put his hand into my breeches, which were 
torn; then he got up, and put out the candle, and 
unbuttoned his own breeches, and bid me play with 
his y—d.” Approximately one week later, Hearne 
botched an errand for his master and was refused 
lodging for the night. Hearne reported the story to 
Bradbury, who promised the boy that he would find 
him new employment. Hearne quit his apprenticeship 
before Bradbury could locate a new position and 
was subsequently left homeless. Bradbury eventually 
billeted Hearne with his friends Mr. and Mrs. Whitaker, 
and Hearne claims that he and Bradbury lay together 
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at the Whitakers’ “four or five times,” and each time 
Bradbury “flung his legs about me, and kiss’d me; and 
first tried with his finger to enter my body, then he tried 
with his y—d, and did enter as far as he could, and his 
s—d came from him.” After floating between several 
other jobs and lodgings and having intercourse with 
Bradbury once more at the chapel, Hearne confessed 
to Mrs. Whitaker what had transpired between him 
and Bradbury. What followed, Hearne claims, was 
this: Mrs. Whitaker took Hearne to see her friends 
the Browns, whereupon they called for Bradbury 
and Hearne made his accusations to Bradbury’s face. 
Bradbury ordered Hearne to recant and threatened to 
charge Hearne with the theft of candlesticks from the 
chapel and see him hanged. Hearne agreed to recant, 
and Bradbury had intercourse with him that very night. 
Bradbury then suggested that Hearne spend some time 
in France and, as he arranged for Hearne’s passage 
(through one of his friends, Mrs. Pickering), had the 
boy locked up in the cellar of another friend, Mr. 
Kipling. Hearne stayed one month in France, returned, 
and again charged Bradbury with indecent action. 
Bradbury retaliated by taking out a warrant against 
Hearne, who was subsequently brought before one 
Justice Wright, at which point he once again recanted. 
Bradbury then ordered one of his friends to take 
Hearne away to the country for a month. 
At this point in Hearne’s narrative, he is cross-
examined. In the exchange that follows, it is clear that, 
in order for Hearne to condemn Bradbury, he must 
strategically position himself as a child innocent  
even to the meaning of sodomy. This makes both 
Hearne and Bradbury legible to the judge—one as an 
innocent child, the other as the perverse adult who 
corrupted him:
Q. The first account you gave . . . you say you was  
         [sic] leaning upon the chimney-piece, that he  
         drag’d you on his knee; did he make use of force?
HEARNE. No.
Q. You say he put his hand through a hole into your  
         breeches; did you make any resistance?
HEARNE. No, sir.
Q. When he came to put his hand on your private  
         parts; did you make any resistance then?
HEARNE. No.
Q. What did you say to him?
HEARNE. I said nothing at all to him.
Q. Then you say, he desired you to take hold of his  
         y—d, did you do that?
HEARNE. I did.
Q. Did you do every thing he bid you do?
HEARNE. I did.
. . . Q. Did not you know these things were wrong?
HEARNE. As it came from a minister, I did not.
. . . Q. If any body else had offered those things,  
         should you have thought it a sin?
HEARNE. No sir, I should not.
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. . . Q. Then did you not know that sodomy was a crime?
HEARNE. No sir, I did not know that.
Interestingly, this strategy (combined with Hearne’s admission that 
Bradbury did not use force in his seduction) requires Hearne to claim 
that he did not struggle with Bradbury. In his account, Hearne is so 
free of perverse sexual knowledge that he acts as a child naively doing 
what the adult tells him to do. Hearne’s story, however, leaves itself 
open to another (unanswerable) question: is it possible that Hearne was 
consenting to sexual activity with Bradbury? Legally, this question—and 
the version of a perverse child with agency that it would entail—is 
unimaginable and unspeakable, and thus remains unasked.
Whitaker, Brown, and several other witnesses testify prior to 
Bradbury’s statement. Bradbury claims that Hearne had confessed “an 
abominable act he had committed with a man,” and upon learning 
that Bradbury had disclosed this secret to one of Hearne’s potential 
employers, Hearne “threaten’d he would be reveng’d on [Bradbury]” 
and thus accused Bradbury not “with the act of sodomy, but indecent 
actions.” Bradbury’s defence hinges on the narrative of Hearne as a 
dangerous, perverse child: one corrupted before Bradbury knew him 
and, like Jack Perverse, willing to deceive and threaten. Bradbury’s 
argument is buttressed by Mrs. Pickering’s testimony, during which she 
is asked:
Q. What is your opinion of the boy?
E. PICKERING. I believe he is a very bad boy.
Q. Do you believe it is any difficult thing to make a bad boy recant?
E. PICKERING. I believe not.
. . . it is clear that, in 
order for Hearne to 
condemn Bradbury, 
he must strategically 
position himself as a child 
innocent even to the 
meaning of sodomy.
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Following Pickering’s time on the stand, a man named 
Lew testifies that he overheard Hearne admitting to 
Bradbury’s innocence near the Old Bailey coffee 
house. Hearne is questioned regarding this statement, 
and the trial then concludes with surprising rapidity:
Q. to HEARNE. Is this the truth? had you this  
         conversation in the Poultry-compter? what do  
         you say to it?
HEARNE. Yes, I had; he is innocent.
COURT. You have sworn now he is guilty, how do  
         you reconcile it? do you now say he is innocent?
HEARNE. Yes.
COUNCIL FOR THE CROWN. Has any body spoke  
         to you since you came into court?
HEARNE. No. (He cry’d)
Q. What do you cry for?
HEARNE. My conscience accuses me; and because  
         I have spoke [sic] lies.
This sudden and surprising conclusion invites a 
number of provocative but unanswerable questions, 
among them why Hearne accused Bradbury of sodomy 
and subsequently recanted so many times. As Jon 
Thomas Rowland writes in his reading of the case, the 
trial “raises too many questions, and suggests too many 
possibilities, simply to expose the sodomitical Hearne 
and vindicate the heterosexual Bradbury, as it was 
meant to do” (89).10
In Mr. Bradbury’s Case, the version of Hearne as 
inherently and irremediably perverse is foregrounded 
in the Minister’s attempt to portray himself as the 
victim of a dangerous child, whom he describes as 
“an old Practitioner at his foul Game before he came 
from France” (17). Bradbury dedicates a significant 
portion of his book to detailing Hearne’s alleged sexual 
experiences with other men, beginning with the story 
of “one Mrs D—” who supposedly sought Bradbury 
out to inform him “that James Hearne had forcibly 
committed Sodomy on the Body of her Son, a Lad 
about fourteen Years of Age, and his Fellow-prentice” 
(9). Bradbury further claims that Hearne confessed  
that, after having quit his job and finding himself 
homeless, “he had lain the first Night . . . with a young 
Man near Strand Bridge . . . and on Sunday-night 
he had lain with Mr. Gillyman, a Schoolmaster at 
Kensington, where he had formerly been at school” 
and had also gone with an older man to an alehouse 
“in Butcher-row, where the Man kept [Hearne] till very 
late, and then ask’d him to go and lie with him:  
and accordingly they went to a House in a Court 
opposite to Somerset-house, in the Strand, where the 
man . . . acted in a very beastly Manner” (10–11). 
Based on these stories, Bradbury finds himself 
“convinced that [Hearne] was a very vile Lad” and 
decides that he should warn one of Hearne’s potential 
employers about the boy’s proclivity for sodomy, since 
Bradbury feels “afraid [Hearne] would practice those 
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beastly Actions wherever he lived, and so not only 
bring a Scandal on himself, but also on those who 
should commend him” (11–12). Hearne’s discovery 
that Bradbury had betrayed his trust, Bradbury claims, 
was Hearne’s motive for charging Bradbury with 
sodomy. But Bradbury’s depiction of Hearne shifts from 
the narrative of the perverse child into the narrative 
of the innocent child: not only is Hearne intrinsically 
and permanently perverse, bound to cause trouble in 
perpetuity, but he is also the seduced victim of Brown 
and Whitaker’s plot to ruin Bradbury. “During the 
whole Time of my examining [Hearne]” regarding the 
boy’s accusations of sodomy, Bradbury writes, “both 
Brown and his Wife encouraged him to speak up freely 
and boldly; which he, finding himself so well back’d, 
did with an uncommon Assurance, and continued so to 
do upon their spiriting him on with—Well done, James, 
laughing all the while” (13–14). The Browns, here, are 
the corrupt adults who lead an already susceptible boy 
deeper into dangerous perversion.
Hearne’s agency appears between the gaps of 
these narratives, but only as a series of possibilities. In 
Stockton’s discussion of how children seem “queer” 
to adults due to their opaque reasons for behaving in 
certain ways, she argues that “the notion of ‘children’s 
motives’ in the realms of sex and crime is not often 
a publicly available concept. The law has virtually 
made the idea of children’s motives oxymoronic” (52). 
Indeed, the suggestion that Hearne may have used 
his sexuality in certain ways and with agency—that 
is, that he potentially had motives for having sex 
with Bradbury, and then accused him of sodomy 
and recanted repeatedly—remains unthinkable. I 
would like to consider the possibility that Hearne 
was entering into a version of what Anthony Giddens 
calls a “pure relationship” in The Transformation of 
Intimacy, his examination of the changing shape of 
romantic love and the increasing democratisation of 
intimate relationships. According to Giddens, a pure 
relationship is “a situation where a social relation 
is entered into for its own sake, for what can be 
derived by each person from a sustained association 
with another; and which is continued only in so far 
as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough 
satisfactions for each individual to stay within it” (58). 
Giddens argues that the eighteenth century saw the 
emergence of “plastic sexuality,” a form of sexuality 
“freed from the needs of reproduction,” which was 
necessary for emancipatory intimacy, “a transactional 
negotiation of personal ties by equals” (2, 3). I am not 
claiming that the relationship between Bradbury and 
Hearne was mutual and without a troubling power 
dynamic. Hearne himself says in court, in response to 
a question about why he continued to go to bed with 
Bradbury: “I was afraid of him, and I had no other 
friend but him in the world to stand by me.” I draw 
on Giddens to conjure an image of a relationship 
based on particular needs that manifest themselves 
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at particular times, and to suggest that Hearne may 
have used his sexuality in a “plastic” way to enter into 
relationships tactically for the purpose of survival, to 
“make do” given a difficult situation. Outcast by his 
father for rejecting Catholicism, unable to hold a job, 
part of the impoverished working class and frequently 
homeless, Hearne may have based his relationship 
with Bradbury on an inextricable entanglement 
of desire, pleasure, fear, and sheer need. In other 
words, Hearne’s identity—as constructed through 
the trial and the pamphlets it spawned—exceeds the 
reductive, innocent-child self he consciously takes up 
and performs in court for the purpose of prosecuting 
Bradbury and Bradbury’s equally simplistic narrative of 
Hearne as an inherently perverse child.
When elements from both Hearne and Bradbury’s 
versions of the case are assembled, the story about 
Hearne that emerges is an interesting one. If Hearne 
indeed confessed to Bradbury that he had previously 
slept with men, and Bradbury indeed disclosed this 
secret to one of Hearne’s potential employers, then it 
follows that Hearne would turn to the Whitakers and 
the Browns for assistance, since he could seemingly 
no longer trust or depend on Bradbury. It also follows, 
however, that Hearne would be conflicted about 
these accusations if he cared to some extent for 
Bradbury (regardless of whether or not they actually 
had intercourse), and would attempt to reconcile with 
the man he calls his only friend in the world. Taylor’s 
Remaks [sic] on Mr. Bradbury’s State of His Case raises 
a number of other questions in this regard: why was its 
author—a seemingly random, disinterested party—so 
invested in proving that Bradbury was a sodomite? 
Why was there more anxiety around Bradbury’s 
sexual practices than Hearne’s? It seems to me that 
Taylor and perhaps other members of the public 
wanted Bradbury branded a sodomite to foreclose the 
possibility that Hearne may have demonstrated sexual 
agency; the perverse child with agency is absent from 
the discourse surrounding this case. Hearne becomes 
the battleground where adult anxieties about sexual 
practice play themselves out. Taylor’s story requires a 
passive Hearne whose agency cannot be the subject 
of speculation, since doing so would undercut the 
perverse adult/innocent child narrative upon which 
Taylor depends. Regarding Bradbury’s depiction of the 
Browns and the Whitakers, Taylor writes: “And [is this] 
the Manner that People are to be treated with, namely, 
to have their Characters torn to Pieces for endeavouring 
to assist a poor Boy, who applied first of all to them 
for Justice to be done him?” (23). For Taylor’s argument 
to stand, Hearne must be the innocent victim, Brown 
and Whitaker his saviours, and Bradbury the perverse 
villain: further complexity is impossible.
When read from a perspective that accounts for 
the possibility of a type of pure relationship between 
Bradbury and Hearne, however, Taylor’s text seems 
to undermine itself at various moments. In Taylor’s 
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narrative, Hearne is initially represented as Bradbury’s captive: 
Hearne was “carried from Place to Place disguised in [Bradbury’s] 
Dress, cloathed with the Prisoner’s own Cloaths, maintained by 
the Prisoner’s Friends . . . all this to keep the Prosecutor out of the 
Way” (29). Taylor also claims that, while Bradbury was in prison, he 
nonetheless had friends shelter, clothe, feed, and provide Hearne 
with “Sixpence a Day . . . for Pocket-money” (29). Interestingly, 
Taylor also details how Hearne would attempt to visit Bradbury in 
prison: “[Bradbury] said he heard the Boy was knocking at New 
Prison gates,” Taylor writes, “and that some Woman look’d through 
the Wicket and asked him who he wanted, on which he reply’d, 
is Mr. Bradbury here, the Woman said yes, on this the Boy cry’d, 
express’d a great deal of Concern for him, and went away” (28). This 
moving passage invites the question: did Hearne miss, care for, and 
need his captor/captive, his only friend? In spite of Taylor’s attempts 
to flatten Hearne and Bradbury into legible tropes, his narrative 
becomes increasingly ambiguous as the predator/prey narrative slips 
into something more complex:
[Hearne] was taken from his Friends that he had applied to in 
order to bring you to Justice, that you might send him to some 
of your Friends, and maintained, not like one that had been so 
wicked as to swear so detestable a Crime against you, but rather 
like a loving Wife or Child, always living exceedingly well, 
having one to take Care of him. (35)
What, exactly, is Taylor doing here? Is Taylor trying to prove that 
Bradbury loved the boy, and thus would have wanted to sodomize 
him? Why would Bradbury take such good care of a boy who was 
In spite of Taylor’s 
attempts to flatten 
Hearne and Bradbury 
into legible tropes, 
his narrative becomes 
increasingly ambiguous 
as the predator/prey 
narrative slips into 
something more 
complex . . . .
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repeatedly accusing him of sodomy? And why would 
Hearne show such concern for someone who had 
sexually molested him on a number of occasions? 
Taylor’s portrait of Bradbury does not ultimately 
represent the minister as a predatory sodomite, but 
rather depicts a compassionate man who still seemed 
to care for Hearne in spite of the boy’s accusations, 
treating him as a “loving Wife or Child.” Through this 
striking break in his otherwise standard predator/prey 
narrative, Taylor undercuts his approach to the case: he 
adds layers of complexity to our reading of Hearne and 
Bradbury’s relationship by depicting Hearne as a boy 
who actively seeks Bradbury’s company and Bradbury 
as a man whose feelings for Hearne exceed perverse 
sexual desire.
Taylor’s narrative, which largely absents Hearne, 
ironically makes the boy visible from a more 
sympathetic and complicated perspective, work that 
Bradbury strives to undo in The Cobler Undone. In  
this pamphlet, Bradbury returns to the reductive trope 
of the inherently perverse and dangerous child to 
define Hearne:
Hearne was guilty of sodomitical knowledge before 
I had any acquaintance with him or knowledge 
of him; which, in the opinion of every judicious 
thinking man, must plead strongly in my behalf, 
and that such an experienced practitioner as 
Hearne was, could easily form a tale . . . to suit the 
purpose of malice or revenge, either for himself or 
his abettors. (23)
By this point, due to Taylor’s account of the young 
apprentice’s behaviour, Hearne is already far more 
complicated than a simple Jack Perverse figure. Prior 
to Romantic-era attempts to fashion childhood and 
the subsequent anxieties about perversion these 
attempts entailed, Hearne emerges as a figure that 
in many ways subverts the two overlapping tropes of 
inherently perverse/prone-to-perversion childhood 
that would come to circulate in Romantic discourse. 
In her contemporary theorization of children’s queer 
characteristics, Stockton observes that children’s 
motives are “more often a living, growing, cubist form 
of dramatically mismatched feelings and movements 
from different temporalities and multilayered sideways 
inclinations” (157). The motivation of this eighteenth-
century boy should also be read with such complexity, 
however. I invite an understanding of Hearne as a 
more active player than he is in Bradbury’s and Taylor’s 
representations: is it possible that Hearne takes up and 
deploys a plastic sexuality to actively fashion a life 
that enables his survival and perhaps even allows for 
moments of pleasure?
Conclusion: Raising Jack Perverse in the Twenty-First 
Century
Contemporary society continues to silence the 
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sexual child in its criminalization of certain expressions 
of sexuality. In 2006, Canada’s Conservative 
government introduced a bill to increase the age of 
sexual consent from fourteen to sixteen years and 
began speaking of the “age of protection” in lieu of 
the age of consent. Although the law was ostensibly 
introduced to “protect children from adults who prey 
on them for purposes of sexual exploitation,” as Justice 
Minister Vic Toews argued, it also functions to maintain 
the unspeakability of the language of sexual agency 
in the context of children and youth. “One problem 
with the current law,” Toews claimed, “is that adults 
can claim in their defence that youth consented to sex 
. . . youth are made uncomfortable testifying in court.” 
Toews’s solution, then, is to remove the capacity for 
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds to consent to sex and 
their ability to tell their own stories in court, ultimately 
confining individuals of this age to the reductive trope 
of the innocent child who is vulnerable to perversion.11 
Also notable is the Conservative government’s 
maintenance of the age of consent for anal sex at 
eighteen years, a clear confirmation of the fact that 
some forms of perversion are even more undesirable 
and unimaginable than others (Mendoza).
I am certainly not arguing for a laissez-faire 
approach to the regulation of sexual activity involving 
children, but I want to highlight the striking parallels 
between eighteenth-century narratives of childhood 
and perversity, and contemporary conceptions of 
children and sexuality. Many of the same stories and 
sexual possibilities remain silenced, unspeakable, 
and unimaginable in legal and social discourse. As 
Stockton argues, perhaps children are so fervently 
protected because they are frightening, because “we 
are threatened by the spectre of their longings that are 
maddeningly, palpably opaque,” and because the  
very concept of innocence is threatening since it can 
be so easily lost (126). Indeed, I believe it essential 
to ask the questions prompted by Stockton: what is 
at stake in our continued investment in a concept of 
childhood that sees the child as both innocent and 
constantly in danger? Why do some possibilities for 
a self-fashioning, “making-do” childhood remain 
unspeakable? Is it because the child is too valuable  
as a symbol of innocence and a vessel for adult hopes 
and anxieties about the transition into (heterosexual) 
adulthood? Or, is it because we remain deeply 
ambivalent about the perverse potential of childhood 
and thus attempt to impose legible and coherent 
narratives onto children’s ambiguous motives and 
complex desires—stories similar to the cautionary  
tale of Jack Perverse? And where do productive gaps  
between these stories emerge, counter-narratives 
that can critique and challenge the stories that have 
become so sedimentary by their repetition through  
the centuries?
Jack Perverse is a naughty boy, who does everything 
a good boy shouldn’t do. . . .
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Notes
 1 Burder’s Early Piety and other Romantic-era works for and about 
children teem with Jack Perverse-type characters, many of whom 
bear names that reflect their “perverse” natures. In Moral Instruction 
and Fiction for Children, 1749–1820, Samuel F. Pickering, Jr. 
explains that “early children’s fiction was rigorously instructive. 
Although the narratives were often wonderfully entertaining and 
imaginative, they rarely presented complex views of human nature” 
(vii). Characters similar to Jack Perverse can be found in an array 
of texts, including Sarah Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories, Mary Ann 
Kilner’s works (which include The Memoirs of a Peg-Top), and 
Maria Edgeworth’s The Parent’s Assistant, all of which are morally 
didactic fictional works for children. Although perversity manifests 
itself differently depending on the story and character in question, 
for the purposes of this essay I use Jack Perverse as a figure who 
represents this recurring fictional trope of the perverse child.
 2 I am indebted to Jonathan Dollimore’s elucidation of the 
paradoxes of perversity in his book Sexual Dissidence. Perversion, 
he writes, “is very often perceived as at once utterly alien to what it 
threatens, and yet, mysteriously inherent within it” (121).
 3 It is often taken for granted that contemporary conceptions 
of the child and childhood have their deepest roots in Romantic 
thought. For example, in their survey of children’s literature (which 
notably begins with Romanticism), Deborah Cogan and Jean 
Webb cite Mitzi Myers’s claim that “the Romantic child is our 
foundational fiction” (13). Through representations of Hearne in the 
documents related to Bradbury’s sodomy trial, I intend to illustrate 
how notions of childhood commonly understood to be Romantic 
were actually in circulation prior to the Romantic era.
 4 In chapter three of The Practice of Everyday Life, de Certeau 
outlines a detailed distinction between tactics and strategies along 
the lines of time and space. A subject employs a strategy when 
“it postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve 
as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of 
targets or threats can be managed” (36). A tactic, however, does 
not entail this sense of exteriority: “the space of a tactic is the 
space of the other. Thus it must play on and with a terrain imposed 
on it and organized by the law of a foreign power” (37). For the 
purposes of this essay, I use “tactic” in lieu of “strategy” since 
it speaks to the way Hearne’s actions seem largely improvised 
based on opportunities for survival in a system that saw him at a 
disadvantage because of his age and his class position.
 5 While I do not claim that my analysis of Hearne’s specific 
case can be unproblematically mapped onto contemporary 
understandings of children, I am hoping to draw parallels between 
the narratives of childhood and perversity that were at work 
around the time of Hearne’s case and the ways in which children 
and sexual agency are taken up in contemporary theory and 
dialogue about age-of-consent legislation. I deal generally with 
conceptualizations of both male and female children, but the 
subject of my chosen case study is male, and I recognize that the 
rhetoric of sexual agency circulates quite differently depending on 
the gender of the child in question.
 6 An earlier version of this paradox of childhood perversity 
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appeared in John Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education 
(1693). Locke is well known for his description of the child as 
tabula rasa: “white Paper, or Wax, to be moulded and fashioned 
as one pleases” (265). However, Locke also argues that children 
have “predominant Passions and prevailing Inclinations” that can 
be of “the humbler and meaner sort” (163). It was through a proper 
education that these less desirable “native Propensities” could be 
“mended, and turned to good purposes” (163). As John W. Yolton 
and Jean S. Yolton note in their edition of Locke’s text, “the white-
paper metaphor must not be taken too literally . . . the stereotype 
of Locke as believing the mind entirely empty at birth needs to be 
rejected and replaced by his recognition of traits, tempers, and 
tendencies, as well as a large number of faculties” (163). A Lockean 
ambivalence surrounding the balance between children’s inherent 
innocence/malleability and their perverse potential informs the 
discourse surrounding childhood through the Romantic era to the 
present day.
 7 Paul Kelleher’s “How to Do Things with Perversion” is a useful 
account of how Freudian psychoanalysis (and, later, Melanie 
Klein’s writing) built on these Romantic narratives to fuse notions 
of the criminal and the pervert and to attribute the existence of 
these loathsome characters to child psychic development gone 
awry. In Kelleher’s words, “the murderous ‘pervert,’ again and 
again, is figured as both interior to and anterior to our conception 
of the child, phantasmatically surrounding and overtaking any 
psychoanalytic profile of the ‘child’” (167). Kelleher draws on 
Foucault’s lecture “The Dangerous Individual” to illustrate how 
the child and the pervert converged to create the concept of “the 
‘natural-born killer’: a set of discrete criminal acts, arranged within 
the evidentiary patterns of a case history, is theoretically redescribed 
as the true confessions of the criminal’s (or what will come to be the 
same, the homosexual’s) nature” (161). Although the texts described 
in this essay predate the emergence of psychoanalytic discourses 
of (homo)sexuality, Jack Perverse and his equally perverse fictional 
contemporaries worked to characterize what Foucault would later 
call the natural-born killer: they all demonstrate inherent perverse 
tendencies that manifest themselves in activities like the violent 
torture of insects and small animals.
 8 The letters include a very strange note signed “Beelzebub” that 
Bradbury apparently received while in prison (The Cobler Undone 
35–36). Much space is also spent debating relatively insignificant 
claims like whether or not Hearne was ever actually held in the 
basement of Bradbury’s friend Mr. Kipling.
 9 The near-untwistable, tangled web of stories that comes to 
constitute Bradbury and Hearne’s case is so complex that composing 
a complete and coherent overview would be an arduous and lengthy 
task; for this reason, I will include only the details that are relevant 
to an understanding of this paper. Unless otherwise noted, all trial 
details—quoted directly and paraphrased—are taken from the Old 
Bailey transcript (“Charles Bradbury”).
 10 Rowland provides a Foucauldian reading of Bradbury’s pamphlet 
in “Mr. Bradbury’s Case Truly Stated: A Polyvalent Text,” but the 
author is uninterested in interrogating how Hearne is represented.
 11 The Age of Protection bill also reinforces the notion that all sexual 
activity is necessarily traumatic for youth and children under a 
certain age. For an insightful discussion and critique of this popular 
belief, see Bruhm and Hurley, “Curiouser.”
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